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Problem area 
The actual development of satellite 
navigation systems is crucial and 
includes after the already 
introduced EGNOS system 
(augmentation of GPS), the planned 
modernization of GPS, and the 
newly designed European Galileo 
system. For safety of life 
applications of the satellite 
navigation systems reliability in the 
sense of integrity, availability and 
continuity is essential. In order to 
test the integrity, availability and 
continuity, a test method is 
required. In practice, it is a 
requirement to be able to perform 
the analysis based on a limited 
amount of data collected within an 
acceptable observation time. This 
report presents such a test method 
analyzing receiver output data of 
limited duration for SBAS. 
 
Description of work 
During a first research effort, a 
practical test method has been 
developed for analyzing receiver 
output data. As a test case the 
method has been applied to data 
gathered during a test campaign of 
limited duration for EGNOS. With 
this method an accurate estimate of 
the integrity, availability and  
continuity can be made. In the 
paper, a detailed discussion of the 
analysis of availability, integrity 
and continuity is given. In the paper 
it is noted that the method is 
promising indeed, however it is a 
requirement to continue this 
investigation in order to improve 
the confidence which can be put on 
the method and the results. 
 
Results and conclusions 
From the test case with EGNOS 
data, as presented in this paper, it 
can be concluded that the estimation 
of the integrity, availability and 
continuity on the basis of test 
campaign data is possible indeed. 
The results of the test case show the 
integrity usually satisfies the 
requirements, however the 
availability and continuity for the 
APV1 and more stringent 
aeronautical services was usually 
insufficient. 
 
Applicability 
The method developed is to be used 
to analyze measurement data 
gathered during test campaigns in 
order to estimate the reliability of 
the navigation satellite system in the 
sense of integrity, availability and 
continuity. 
 
This report is based on a presentation held at the ION conference, Fort Worth, Texas (U.S.A.) September 26-29, 2006.
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Summary 
For safety of life applications of satellite navigation systems, in e.g. aviation, reliability in the 
sense of integrity, availability and continuity is essential. In order to test the integrity, 
availability and continuity, a test method is required. In practice, it is a requirement to be able to 
perform the analysis based on a limited amount of data collected within an acceptable 
observation time.  This paper presents such a method for analyzing receiver output data of 
limited duration for SBAS. In the paper, a detailed discussion of the analysis of availability, 
integrity and continuity is given. 
 
The availability computation starts from the measured protection level data. It is possible to 
approach the protection level probability distribution by the Weibull distribution as will be 
shown in the paper. 
 
The HMI (Hazardous Misleading Information) probability depends on two basic parameters: the 
actual position error and the computed protection level. Usually one presents the test results in 
the so-called Stanford plots visualizing the occurrence of Hazardous Misleading Information. 
Since the probability of HMI is very low, it is not practical to state that the HMI probability is 
the ratio of the number of HMI results divided by the total number of measured samples. Very 
often, no HMI condition occurs during the tests; the resulting number of HMI conditions will 
then be zero and the computed HMI probability on this basis will then be zero as well, being 
obviously incorrect. Therefore, we need to invent a correct way in obtaining a realistic estimate 
of the HMI probability also called the integrity risk. The method developed for this purpose 
starts from the determination of two probability density functions: the probability density 
distribution of the protection level and a probability density function related to the position 
error, together forming a two dimensional probability density function.  
 
It is possible to compute the continuity risk (or non-continuity) as function of the alert limit. It 
turns out the resulting non-continuity probability distribution can be approached by a lognormal 
distribution. 
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Abbreviations 
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HAL  Horizontal Alert Limit 
HMI  Hazardous Misleading Information 
HPE  Horizontal Position Error 
HPL  Horizontal Protection Level 
MI  Misleading Information 
SBAS  Space Based Augmentation System 
UTC  Universal Time, Coordinated 
VAL  Vertical Alert Limit 
VPE  Vertical Position Error 
VPL  Vertical Protection Level 
WAAS  Wide Area Augmentation System 
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1 Introduction 
For safety of life applications of satellite navigation systems, in e.g. aviation, reliability in the 
sense of integrity, availability and continuity is essential. In order to test the integrity, 
availability and continuity, a test method is required. In practice, it is a requirement to be able to 
perform the analysis based on a limited amount of data collected within an acceptable 
observation time.  The presented test method for availability, continuity and integrity starts from 
the determination of the probability density distribution of measured events. For SBAS, these 
events will be the protection levels. For integrity analysis, these events will be the protection 
levels as function of the position errors. 
 
Basic approach 
 
Availability 
The availability computation starts from the measured protection level data. Use is made of the 
Weibull probability distribution to approach the protection level probability distribution. The 
use of this Weibull distribution is justified because of its special features as explained later on in 
this paper. The presented test data do show that it behaves like the Weibull distribution indeed. 
 
Integrity 
The HMI (Hazardous Misleading Information) probability depends on two basic parameters: the 
actual position error and the computed protection level. Usually one presents the test results in 
the so-called Stanford plots visualizing the occurrence of Hazardous Misleading Information. 
Since the probability of such HMI condition generally is very low, it is not practical to compute 
the HMI probability as the ratio of the number of HMI results divided by the total number of 
measured samples. So a method is required to determine a realistic estimate of the HMI 
probability. The method developed starts from the determination of two probability density 
functions: the probability density distribution of the protection level and a probability density 
function related to the position error, together forming a two dimensional probability density 
function. Since the uncertainty in the position error increases approximately in ratio with the 
computed protection level, no use is made of the probability density distribution of the position 
error itself, but of the ratio of the position error over the computed protection level. Once the 
position error is larger than the protection level and thus the ratio between them is larger than 
one, we interpret the situation as misleading and accordingly we may speak about the MI 
(Misleading Information) function. In vertical direction, the MI probability is approximately 
normally distributed. In the horizontal plane the MI probability is approximately Rayleigh 
distributed. Summarizing, to compute the HMI probability we need to estimate both the 
protection level and MI probability density distributions.  
  
NLR-TP-2006-594 
 
  10 
Continuity 
It is possible to compute the continuity risk as function of the alert limit. The paper presents the 
applied equations and logic to derive the continuity risk. It turns out that the resulting non-
continuity probability distribution can be approached by a lognormal distribution as will be 
shown on the basis of the presented test data. 
 
 
2 Description of the method with test case results 
As test case, use will be made of EGNOS data recorded at a measurement site at Lugano airport 
with a Septentrio PolaRX2 receiver. The data collected on 21 April 2005 did start at 7.15 hours 
and ended at 13.45 hours UTC (see Ref. 1). 
 
The probability density functions are partly different for the vertical and horizontal case. 
Therefore, it is necessary to split up the discussion in two chapters accordingly. 
 
2.1 Integrity, availability and continuity related to vertical position errors 
Figure 1 shows time series of the Vertical Position Error (VPE) and the Vertical Protection 
Level (VPL). 
 
Figure 1: Time series of the vertical position error and the vertical protection level. 
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Figure 2 shows the histogram of the vertical position error. The 95% percentile vertical error is 
1.89 m. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of the vertical position error. 
 
The computation of the MI probability starts from the vertical position error and the vertical 
protection level. 
 
2.1.1 Misleading Information probability computation 
Figure 3 shows a time series of the ratio between the vertical position error and the vertical 
protection level. 
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Figure 3: Ratio between the vertical position error and the vertical protection level. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the ratio between the vertical position error and the vertical protection level 
behaves approximately as a normal probability distribution. Fitting the normal distribution 
function through the data yields a standard deviation of 0.059. It is possible now to compute the 
MI probability; it is the chance that the vertical position error is larger than the VPL and 
consequently the chance their ratio is larger than one. This probability turns out to be 1.5x10-63. 
Besides this probability one usually is also interested in having a confidence figure of this result. 
However computing the so-called confidence interval in the classical way leads to a far too 
optimistic figure due to the fact that the successive samples are usually not independent; in the 
contrary they are highly correlated. Taking into account a decorrelation time of 2000 seconds 
(see the autocorrelation function of VPE/VPL in figure 5) and a confidence level of 5%, the MI 
probability is 2.3x10-33. Note that according to the original Stanford plot, the MI probability is 
zero and consequently is not correct. 
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Figure 4: Normal probability distribution check of the ratio between the vertical position error and 
the vertical protection level. 
 
 
Figure 5: Autocorrelation of VPE/VPL. 
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2.1.2 Availability computation 
Figure 6 shows the obtained Weibull probability distribution check of the vertical protection 
level. From this figure, it is obvious that the VPL behaves roughly similar as the Weibull 
distribution. In reliability studies (see e.g. Ref. 2); it is normal practice to make use of the 
Weibull distribution. 
 
Figure 6: Weibull probability distribution check of the vertical protection level. 
 
The Weibull probability density function is: 
 
baxb eabxy −−= 1  
 
where a and b are the two statistical shape and scale parameters to be estimated. Note that this 
function essentially consists of the multiplication of two exponential functions; one describing 
the initial fast grows at the start of the distribution (x relatively small) and the other one 
describes the tail part of the distribution. Due to the two exponential functions the description of 
the low values of VPL decouples in relation to the high values of VPL, resulting in an accurate 
prediction of the availability (occurs in the tail part). This way the probability distribution at the 
tail at the right is not disturbed by the central bulk of the data at the left (see figure 7). The 
choice of the Weibull distribution function is justified for two reasons: (1) the start of the 
distribution function is steep allowing the bulk of the data at low VPL magnitudes and (2) the 
central bulk of the data do not disturb the tail towards infinity. 
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Figure 7: Histogram of VPL with Weibull probability distribution including a confidence interval of 
95%. 
 
To compute the confidence interval in figure 7, a decorrelation of the data is essential. The 
decorrelation time used for the VPL is 2000 seconds (see figure 8) 
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Figure 8: Autocorrelation of VPL. 
 
It is now possible to compute the unavailability being the probability that the VPL exceeds the 
Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) using the Weibull distribution fit. For a VAL equals 50 m the 
unavailability turns out to be 2.5%. This is less than the originally computed, Stanford plot 
based, unavailability of 5.3%. The cause of this difference is the presence of outliers in the VPL 
(see the histogram of figure 7). For a confidence interval of 95%, the unavailability turns out to 
be 3.9%. 
 
2.1.3 Integrity computation 
Usually one visualizes the integrity risk using the so-called Stanford plots. In the figures 9a, 9b 
and 9c the Stanford plots of the APV-I, APV-II and CAT I services are shown. 
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Figure 9a: Stanford plot for the APV-I service. 
 
Figure 9b: Stanford plot for the APV-II service. 
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Figure 9c: Stanford plot for the CAT-I service. 
 
Note that the number of observed epochs in the MI region is zero in all cases. This of course 
does not mean that the MI and HMI probabilities are zero. To estimate these probabilities we 
have to make use of the probability density distributions described in the previous chapters.  
 
Figure 10 explains the discretized integration scheme to compute the HMI probability PHMI. The 
contribution dPHMI (the yellow colored element in figure 10) is equal: 
 
dVPL
VPL
VPEdP VPLVPE
VPL
VAL
MI ∗∫ )(ω  
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Figure 10: Elements (yellow) to integrate for obtaining the HMI probability. 
 
The computed MI probabilities result by the evaluation of following equations: 
 
dVPLdVPEpVPLpp
VAL
VAL
VPL
VPE
MIVPLHMI ∫ ∫∞ ∗=
0
)()(  
 
dVPLdVPEpVPLpp
VAL VPLVPE
VPL
VPE
MIVPLMI VALVPL ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
=
∗=> )()()(  
 
HMI
VAL
VPLVPE
VPL
VPE
MIVPLMI PdVPLdVPEpVPLpp VALVPL −∗= ∫ ∫
∞
=
<
0
)()(
)(  
 
In the figures 11a, 11b and 11c the availability, the MI risks and HMI risk for the APV-I, APV-
II and CAT-I services are plotted. The contours having the values 1, 0.5, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 10-5 
and 10-10 indicate the probability densities relative to the maximum probability density. Figure 
11c shows that for the CAT-1 service the HMI risk of 3.7x10-66 (5.9x10-66 with confidence 
interval of 5%) is almost neglectable while the availability of 37.8% (2.4% with confidence 
interval of 5%) is dramatically low. 
  
NLR-TP-2006-594 
 
  20 
 
Figure 11a: Availability, MI risks and HMI risk for the APV-I service (the values within brackets 
are 5% confidence values). 
  
Figure 11b: Availability, MI risks and HMI risk for the APV-II service (the values within brackets 
are 5% confidence values). 
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Figure 11c: Availability, MI risks and HMI risk for the CAT-I service (the values within brackets 
are 5% confidence values). 
 
2.1.4 Continuity computation 
Continuity risk is the probability that the system will not provide position information with the 
accuracy and the integrity required during the intended operation, presuming that the system 
was available at the beginning of that operation and was predicted to operate throughout the 
operation. During the APV-I, APV-II and CAT-I operation the specified continuity is 1-8x10-6 
in any 15 seconds. Therefore, each set of 15 consecutive epochs should pass the criteria as 
described in the definition. It is possible now to compute the continuity risk as follows: 
 
∑
=
+→<=
T
t
success ttperiodsentiretheoverVALVPLN
0
)15(  
 
∑
=
<+→+>=
T
t
fail tatVALVPLwhilettoverepochsmoreoratVALVPLN
0
)1511(
 
failsuccess
fail
continuitynon NN
N
P +=_  
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Running these three equations over the VPL registration (see figure 1), results in a continuity 
risk of Pnon-continuity = 0.0031 for VAL = 50 m (APV-I service), 0.016 for VAL = 20 m (APV-II 
service) and 0.11 for VAL = 12 m (CAT-I service). These results lead to the conclusion that the 
requirement for continuity is not satisfied for the APV-I, APV-II and CAT-I services 
(requirement is 8*10-6). It is possible to refine these results and to include confidence intervals; 
however, this is possible only using statistics. Obtaining these statistics is possible by evaluation 
of the three equations above for a range of vertical alert limits varying from the minimum VPL 
up to the maximum VPL occurring in the available data set. Figure 12 shows the non-continuity 
computed as function of the VAL. 
 
Figure 12: Non-continuity as function of VAL. 
 
Figure 13 does show that a lognormal distribution approximately describes the non-continuity 
as function of the VAL. To compute the confidence interval a decorrelation is necessary; for this 
case, a factor 8 was applicable. From the result shown in figure 13 the continuity risk for all 
vertical alert limits can be computed by evaluation of the equation 
 
)0(10 *012.0133.2 >= −−− VALP VALcontinuitynon  
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This equation is the best fit of the non-continuity probability as function of VAL. Since the 
lognormal distribution of figure 13 is not so well described by a straight line, it is suggested to 
split up this function into three local intervals for example as indicated in following table: 
 
Service VAL lower bound upper bound see figure 
APV-1 50 40 60 14 
APV-2 20 15 25 15 
CAT-1 12 7 17 16 
 
 
Figure 13: Lognormal distribution of the non-continuity as function of VAL including 5% 
confidence intervals. 
 
The figures 14, 15 and 16 show the non-continuity versus VAL in the intervals as specified in 
the table. It is possible now to determine from these intervals the continuity risk for the APV1, 
APV2 and CAT1 services respectively. 
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Figure 14: Lognormal distribution of the non-continuity as function of VAL from 40 to 60 m 
including 5% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 15: Lognormal distribution of the non-continuity as function of VAL from 15 to 25 m 
including 5% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 16: Lognormal distribution of the non-continuity as function of VAL from 7 to 17 m 
including 5% confidence intervals. 
 
The actual receiver did not compute an estimate of the expected receiver performance during the 
operation at the start of that operation. The inclusion of such estimate may very well improve 
the continuity performance significantly. 
 
2.2 Integrity, availability and continuity related to horizontal position errors 
Figure 17 shows the time series of the Horizontal Position Error (HPE) and the Horizontal 
Protection Level (HPL). 
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Figure 17: Time series of the horizontal position error and the horizontal protection level. 
 
Figure 18 shows the histogram of the horizontal position error (HPE is the combined error in the 
latitude and longitude direction). The 95% percentile horizontal error is 1.7 m. 
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Figure 18: Histogram of the horizontal position error. 
 
Based on the horizontal position error and the horizontal protection level it is possible to 
compute the MI probability. 
 
2.2.1 Misleading Information probability computation 
Figure 19 shows a time series of the ratio between the horizontal position error and the 
horizontal protection level. 
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Figure 19: Ratio between the horizontal position error and the horizontal protection level. 
 
Fitting the Rayleigh distribution function through these data (HPE/HPL), yields a Rayleigh 
standard deviation of 0.065. It is now possible to compute the MI probability; it is the chance 
that the horizontal position error is larger than the HPL and consequently the chance their ratio 
is larger than one. This probability turns out to be 1.1x10-52. Taking into account a decorrelation 
time of 2000 seconds and a confidence level of 5%, the MI probability is 2.4x10-32. 
 
2.2.2 Availability computation 
Figure 20 shows that the Weibull distribution function describes approximately the horizontal 
protection level distribution in the same way as for the VPL (see figure 7).  
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Figure 20: Histogram of HPL with Weibull probability distribution including a confidence 
interval of 95%. 
 
It is possible now to compute the unavailability, being the probability that the HPL exceeds the 
Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL), using the Weibull distribution fit. For a HAL equals 40 m the 
unavailability turns out to be 2.0%. The Stanford plot (see figure 21) shows an unavailability 
equals 4.2%. For a confidence interval of 95%, the unavailability turns out to be 3.1%. 
 
2.2.3 Integrity computation 
Figure 21 shows the Stanford plot for the APV-II and CAT I services. 
Figure 22 shows that for the APV-II and CAT-1 services the HMI risk is of 2.9x10-56 (4.5x10-56 
with confidence interval of 5%). 
 
  
NLR-TP-2006-594 
 
  30 
 
Figure 21: Stanford plot for the APV-II and CAT-I services. 
 
 
Figure 22: Availability, MI risks and HMI risk for the APV-II and CAT-I services (the values within 
brackets are 5% confidence values). 
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2.2.4 Continuity computation 
Figure 23 shows the non-continuity versus the horizontal alert limit. The continuity risk is thus 
Pnon-continuity = 0.0074 for HAL = 40 m (the APV-II and CAT-I service requirement is 8*10-6).  
 
Figure 23: Lognormal distribution of the non-continuity as function of HAL including 5% 
confidence intervals. 
 
 
3 Brief overview of test results 
From the in the paper presented test results for integrity, availability and continuity, as they are 
related to the vertical as well as the horizontal position errors, the following can be concluded:  
1. EGNOS did satisfy the requirements of the APV-I, APV-II and CAT-I services as far as 
the Hazardous Misleading Information is concerned, 
2. EGNOS did not satisfy the requirements of the APV-I, APV-II and CAT-I services as far 
as availability and continuity is concerned. 
 
Remark 
EGNOS was still under development at the time, hence these conclusions are not valid for 
EGNOS when it becomes fully in operation. 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper presents a test method to analyze receiver output data gathered during a test 
campaign of limited duration for SBAS. With this method, it is always possible to make an 
estimate of the integrity, availability and continuity. The method is applied to an example test 
case and turned out to be applicable indeed. 
 
It is recommended to continue this investigation including following topics: 
• Dependability of results on the data ensemble, 
• Minimal required data period for sufficient confidence, 
• Further investigation of the assumptions made in the method, 
• Setting up, and compare with, alternative statistical approaches wherever possible. 
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